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TRADITION AS PAST AND PRESENT IN
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
KATHARINE T. BARTLETT†
ABSTRACT
Tradition is often understood as an inheritance from the past that
has no connection to the present. Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court
on both ends of the ideological spectrum work from this
understanding, particularly in analyzing cases under the substantive
due process clause. Some conservative Justices say that substantive
due process protects only rights that were firmly established when the
Constitution was ratified. In contrast, some liberal Justices dismiss
tradition as being too stagnant and oppressive to serve as a limit on
substantive due process rights, relying instead on contemporary
norms and reason. Both of these approaches share an oppositional
view of past and present, and permit little opportunity for deeper,
searching inquiry into what liberty interests are so deeply embedded
in this Nation’s identity that they should be protected by the U.S.
Constitution. The Essay presents a richer, interactive understanding of
tradition as a continuity between past and present. Tradition
represents what elements of our evolving past we wish to own in the
present. The Essay explores this alternative view of tradition using as
exemplars some judicial opinions in the substantive due process area,
largely from the Court’s center. It argues that tradition does not
deserve a place in substantive due process analysis simply because it
represents a fixed truth from some distant past, nor should tradition
be entirely rejected as a source of substantive due process rights
simply because of its connection to the past. Understood as a source
of our identity that is both inherited and changing, tradition can serve
as a constructive focal point for determining substantive due process
rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Some political candidates speak of restoring traditional values, as
if going backwards were a meaningful direction and could erase
today’s undesirable social norms. Other candidates speak of
completely changing the way we do business, as if the past could be
swept aside and the present constructed upon a foundation
disconnected from what has come before. These invocations have
rhetorical power and provide a shorthand in political discourse. The
trouble is that, in making a virtue out of distancing past from present,
they also exaggerate divisions within current politics, discourage
efforts to find common ground and shared commitments, and mask
actual commitments behind rhetorical screening.
This dichotomous way of thinking about traditional values
operates not only in politics, but in judicial decisionmaking relating to
individual constitutional rights. For some members of the U.S.
Supreme Court, tradition is the only legitimate source of substantive
due process rights; in other words, no matter how well-accepted a
liberty or identity interest has come to be in present society,
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substantive due process protection is not available unless the right
was already, at some specific chronological moment, “deeply rooted
1
in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Even with respect to equal
protection rights, Justice Scalia believes that “the function of [the
Supreme Court] is to preserve . . . society’s values . . . not to revise
2
them.” For some other Justices, in contrast, tradition is a source of
oppression, and thus a cause for suspicion, not constitutional
instantiation. The opinions of Justices Brennan and Blackmun, for
example, contend that individual rights should be identified based on
reasoned judgment and evolving, expanding contemporary norms,
3
not tradition. On today’s Court, Justice Ginsburg views tradition as
oppressive, not as a source of liberty, and, for this reason, she has
generally preferred equal protection to substantive due process for
4
securing individual rights.
These contrary views share one point in common: that tradition
is based only on the past and has no relation to the present. This
Essay has a modest goal: to show that this view of tradition in
opposition to the present is wrong, both descriptively and
normatively. When courts and advocates reason from tradition,
whatever they pretend to be doing, they are not in fact choosing
between past and present, at least not to the extent, or in the way,
claimed. Even if they could separate past and present as they claim,
this Essay argues that to do so would eviscerate the richness of the
historical dimension that substantive due process is intended to
capture.
Traditions do not exist—and should not inform existing
constitutional law and politics—simply by virtue of their existence in
the past. As this Essay will explain, traditions are transmitted, and
continue only if they are accepted and carried forward from one
5
generation to the next, often in revised form. The need for
acceptance in the present makes tradition a choice, not a discovery of
some objective fact or truth. Tradition represents ownership of a

1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted).
3. See infra notes 73, 76–97 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part II.
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continuity with the past—a present authority, as well as a past one. It
is not the absence of change; “the very traditionality of law ensures
7
that it must change.” Indeed, change often strengthens, rather than
8
weakens, tradition.
Conversely, today’s normative commitments do not spring fully
clothed from the present. The present builds on what was transmitted,
and received, from the past. Accordingly, change means revision, not
creation, and is best secured on its foundations in the past—carefully
9
rethought and reconsidered. In this important sense there is pastness
10
in the present, and presence in the past.
I proceed in this Essay first by exploring how tradition is
understood in some representative substantive due process opinions
at each end of the Court’s ideological spectrum. I then sketch an
alternative, more integrated approach to tradition and demonstrate
the application of this approach in judicial opinions that tend to be
associated with the Court’s “center.” The positions I explore
correspond roughly to the different theories of constitutional
interpretation evident in the broader arena of constitutional
interpretation—not surprisingly, because the interpretative theories
themselves reflect the same contrasting views of history and change.
Originalists, who believe the Constitution should be interpreted
11
according to its original meaning, also believe that only rights that
existed at the time of the Framers or when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified should be protected by substantive due
process and that present norms and circumstances are irrelevant.

6. Martin Krygier, Law as Tradition, 5 LAW & PHIL. 237, 240 (1986); see also id. at 250
(“Traditions depend on real or imagined continuities between past and present.”).
7. Id. at 251.
8. See Joseph R. Gusfield, Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of
Social Change, 72 AM. J. SOC. 351, 357–58 (1967).
9. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition, Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist Legal
Thought, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 303, 305 (“[T]he primary impulse for social change seeks
reconciliation between the familiar and an evolving sense of what is just and good, rather than a
radical break from the past.”).
10. See Krygier, supra note 6, at 256 (“Important traditions are a combination of
inheritance and (often creative) reception and transmission.”).
11. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 823 (1986) (“[O]riginal intent is the only legitimate basis for
constitutional decisionmaking.”); Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Interpretation, 44 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 631, 631 (1993) (“To interpret a document simply means to attempt to determine what
its author or authors intended to convey.”); Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution:
Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1020 (1992) (“Originalism is a virtual axiom of our
legal-political system, necessary to distinguish the judicial from the legislative function.”).
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Rationalists or perfectionists are not constrained by the past, favoring
instead the use of reasoned judgment in light of today’s realities to
13
extend substantive due process precedents. Although these
approaches take opposite stances toward tradition, they share the
view that answers lie either in the past or in the present, but not both.
14
15
In contrast, common-law constitutionalists, Burkean minimalists, or
16
traditional rationalists respect both history and reason. History is
important—indeed, it is given a kind of presumptive weight. But it is
not a single, unchangeable state of affairs at some single, original
17
moment, nor is it the end of the analysis to which contemporary
18
considerations and practices are irrelevant.
Drawing from the same view of the role of history as commonlaw constitutionalists—and as a number of Justices from the Court’s
center—I argue in this Essay that an interactive view of tradition in
which both past and present are relevant is superior to the
dichotomous, either/or view. It is superior not because it inevitably
reaches “better” results, but because it builds on a more realistic view
12. The terms are used in Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353,
356, 394 (2006). Professor Sunstein uses the term “perfectionists” to apply to both those on the
right and those on the left who “want to read the Constitution in a way that fits with the most
attractive political ideals.” Id. at 353.
13. For other “dynamic” theories of interpretation, see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest
for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980), which argues that the Constitution’s
“text and original history” should be given “presumptive weight” but should not be treated as
“authoritative or binding,” id. at 205; and Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide
for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989), which argues for “pragmatic constitutionalism”
that considers not only Constitutional text, but also judicial precedents, American traditions,
and contemporary social values, id. at 1104–06.
14. See, e.g., Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 688 (1994) (advocating for an evolutionary
approach to constitutional interpretation based heavily on precedent).
15. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 389 (advocating for “a conception of the Constitution as
evolving in the same way as traditions and the common law—not through the idiosyncratic
judgments of individual judges, but through a process in which social norms and practices play
the key role”).
16. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 891 (1996) (“The central rational traditionalism idea is that one should be very careful
about rejecting judgments made by people who were acting reflectively and in good faith,
especially when those judgments have been reaffirmed or at least accepted over time.”).
17. See Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—And Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627,
1640 (1997) (“To assume that values articulated at the Founding should apply unchanged is to
overlook the ways in which those values . . . may themselves have changed.”).
18. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (“[H]istory and tradition are the starting
point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.” (quoting
Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (alteration in
original)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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of tradition, encourages transparency, and focuses debate on the
questions most relevant to substantive due process analysis.
I. TRADITION IN SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE:
TWO OPPOSING VIEWS
In this Part, I explore two jurisprudential viewpoints that,
although diametrically opposed in terms of the values they adopt,
share analytically a view of tradition as entailing the past
disassociated from the present. I start with the view—articulated most
forcefully by Justice Scalia—that substantive due process secures only
those particular individual liberties that are “deeply rooted in this
19
Nation’s history and tradition.” I then address the contrary view of
tradition—reflected in different ways in the jurisprudence of Justices
Brennan, Blackmun, and Ginsburg—as an undesirable deadweight
that should not play a significant role in identifying fundamental
liberty rights.
A. Tradition as Positive, Fixed, and Limiting
1. The Model. The view of tradition held by the most
conservative members of the U.S. Supreme Court is that tradition is
discernible, fixed, and the sole source of liberty rights under
substantive due process. In recent decades, the Justices most
associated with this view are Justices White, Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito. To these Justices, substantive due process is a very limited
doctrine, intended only to prevent legislatures from trampling on
individual rights that are already deeply settled in our nation’s earliest
20
traditions. Tradition is, within this view, a limiting principle—an
objective criterion that prevents courts from substituting their own
subjective preferences for those of legislatures. Legislatures are free
21
to depart from tradition, but courts are not. If a tradition was not
19. E.g., id. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192
(1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Court’s function in terms of identifying suspect classes and fundamental rights
is only to “prevent backsliding from the degree of restriction the Constitution imposed upon
democratic government, not to prescribe, on [its] own authority, progressively higher degrees”).
21. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that rights that are not recognized by the Court “are left to be democratically adopted
or rejected by the people”); Virginia, 518 U.S. at 567 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The virtue of a
democratic system with a First Amendment is that it readily enables people, over time, to be
persuaded that what they took for granted is not so, and to change their laws accordingly.”);
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firmly established at the time of the Framers or when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, or if a particular tradition supports a
22
legislative act, the substantive due process challenge at issue fails.
Indeed, Justice Thomas suggests that he would support overruling
past precedents not grounded in enumerated constitutional
23
provisions.
An exemplar of the view of tradition as ascertainable, fixed, and
essential to the identification of rights under substantive due process
24
is Justice White’s majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick. The
opinion upheld the Georgia antisodomy statute at issue in that case
on the ground that sodomy was a criminal offense under many laws in
effect at the time of the ratification of both the Bill of Rights and the
25
Fourteenth Amendment. “Against this background,” Justice White
wrote, the claim that there is a right to engage in homosexual sodomy
26
is “at best, facetious.” In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice
Burger reinforced the reasoning of Justice White. “Decisions of
individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to state
intervention throughout the history of Western civilization,” he
27
wrote. “[P]roscriptions against sodomy have very ‘ancient roots’” in
Roman law, “Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards,” and the
28
common law of England. “To hold that the act of homosexual

Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 (noting that states are free to repeal their laws criminalizing
homosexual sodomy).
22. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 117, 124, 125 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(reasoning that the California law imposing a conclusive presumption of paternity on the
mother’s husband is “more than a century old,” that “[t]he presumption of legitimacy was a
fundamental principle of the common law,” and that “nothing in the older sources, nor in the
older cases, addressed specifically the power of the natural father to assert parental rights over a
child born into a woman’s existing marriage with another man”).
23. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I
write separately to note that neither party has argued that our substantive due process cases
were wrongly decided and that the original understanding of the Due Process Clause precludes
judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights under that constitutional provision.”); cf. id. at 92
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (conceding that the Court’s prior substantive due process cases relating to
the family have some “small claim to stare decisis” but stating that they should not be further
extended).
24. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
25. Id. at 192–94, 196.
26. Id. at 194.
27. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
28. Id. at 196–97 (quoting id. at 192 (majority opinion)).
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sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast
29
aside millennia of moral teaching.”
30
In his dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, which reversed
Bowers, Justice Scalia built upon Justice White’s reasoning in Bowers,
reinforcing the categorical nature of that reasoning. Rights either
were established at the time of the Framers or the ratification of the
31
Fourteenth Amendment, or they were not. According to Justice
Scalia, the challenged Texas antisodomy statute was supported by a
32
long history of sodomy regulation; the right to homosexual sodomy
was not, and therefore could not be, a constitutionally protected
33
right. Present circumstances were irrelevant. For Justice Scalia, it did
not matter that antisodomy statutes generally were not enforced, that
private attitudes toward homosexuals and homosexual sex had
evolved since the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, or that any
other circumstances had changed. All that mattered, in his view, was
that antisodomy statutes had a sufficiently old pedigree or,
alternatively, that legal protection of sodomy did not.
Because this view of tradition is designed explicitly to limit the
34
ability of courts to expand individual rights, it ordinarily carries with
it a preference for defining claimed rights in narrow and specific
terms. Thus, Justice White defined the right at issue in Bowers as the
35
“fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,” rather than
as the more general claim to privacy in the “private, consensual
sexual activity” identified by Justice Blackmun in his dissenting
36
opinion. Similarly, in a challenge to a California statute that
conclusively presumed that the husband of a married woman was her

29. Id. at 197.
30. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
31. See J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1613, 1616 (1990) (arguing that Justice Scalia treats traditions as coming in “discrete units
with discrete boundaries”).
32. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In 1868, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws.”
(quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192–93)).
33. Id. at 594.
34. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195 (majority opinion) (“There should be . . . great
resistance to expand the substantive reach of [the Due Process Clause], particularly if it requires
redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental.”).
35. Id. at 191.
36. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (identifying the issue in the case as whether
“individuals [have] the right to decide for themselves whether to engage in particular forms of
private, consensual sexual activity”).

BARTLETT IN PRINTER PROOF REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

12/4/2012 2:55 PM

TRADITION IN SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

543

child’s father, even against the claim of a man whose blood tests could
establish that he was the child’s biological father, Justice Scalia
characterized the claim narrowly, as that of an “adulterous natural
37
father” who was asking the Court to disregard the “historic
respect . . . traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop
38
within the unitary family,” rather than as that of a natural parent
with a substantial parent-child relationship seeking to accept the
39
responsibilities of parenthood.
Likewise, in Justice Scalia’s
concurring opinion in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
40
Health, a case concerning whether parents may terminate lifesustaining nutrition and hydration for their terminally ill adult child
who was in a persistent vegetative state, Justice Scalia characterized
41
the case as one about the right to assisted suicide, rather than the
more general, and well accepted, right to be free from unwanted
42
medical intervention.
Under the static view of tradition held by Justices White and
Scalia, Court precedents that might support a claimed right are also
read narrowly. Thus, prior decisions protecting rights to intimate
conduct between consenting adults, to procreation, and to possess
obscene material in the privacy of one’s home, are limited in order to
distinguish these established rights from the claim of consenting
adults of a right to be free in their sexual relationships in the privacy
43
of their own homes. Similarly, prior decisions securing rights for an
unmarried father who developed a relationship with his child are
44
narrowed in Michael H. v. Gerald D. to the context of the “unitary

37. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120 (1989) (plurality opinion).
38. Id. at 123.
39. Id. at 142–46 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the nature of the parent-child
relationship without regard to marriage and objecting to the plurality’s repeated references to
the “adulterous natural father”) (quoting the plurality opinion (emphasis added)).
40. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
41. Id. at 294–97 (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding the petitioner’s case to be legally
indistinguishable from “ordinary suicide”).
42. Id. at 312 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91, 195 (1986) (“[N]one of the rights
announced in those cases bears any resemblance to the [right at issue]. No connection between
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated . . . .”), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
44. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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family,” and precedents relating to bodily integrity are limited in
46
Cruzan by the state’s tradition of prohibiting assisted suicide.
In contrast to the narrowing of constitutional claims and the
precedents that might support them, the traditions drawn upon to
support the challenged legislative acts are defined broadly. In
Lawrence, Justice Scalia drew upon an undifferentiated history of
antisodomy laws to support broadly a state’s right to ban homosexual
sodomy, even though some of those bans—like those on heterosexual
sodomy—would be unconstitutional under the Court’s prior family47
privacy precedents. In Michael H., Justice Scalia defined broadly the
common-law presumption of the legitimacy of a child so as to support
the application of the California statute, even though the fact
presumed could be scientifically disproved by a blood test and
notwithstanding prior Court precedents about the rights of a father
48
who has formed a relationship with his child. A history of statutes
prohibiting suicide provides cover in Cruzan for state statutes that
constrict the ability of individuals to make end-of-life decisions for
family members, notwithstanding common-law traditions relating to
49
medical decisionmaking and family autonomy.
An advantage claimed by the Justices who adhere to this
particular tradition-based method for deciding substantive due
process cases is that it avoids subjective value judgments by courts.
When courts are limited to measuring a constitutional claim against
the existence of a long-established tradition, their own personal views
of the tradition do not enter into the calculation. “[B]eyond all
serious dispute,” Justice Scalia wrote in McDonald v. City of
50
Chicago, the historical method he employs “is much less subjective,
and intrudes much less upon the democratic process,” than the
alternative “vague ethico-political First Principles whose combined
51
conclusion can be found to point in any direction the judges favor.”
45. Id. at 123.
46. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279–80.
47. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 595–96 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 215–18
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding it “perfectly clear” that certain historical antisodomy statutes
would be unconstitutional under the Court’s family-privacy precedents).
48. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125–30 (plurality opinion) (interpreting the Court’s
precedents to be inapplicable to a father’s assertion of “rights over a child born into a woman’s
existing marriage with another man”).
49. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294–95 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing prohibitions on assisted
suicide and concluding that the petitioner did not have a fundamental right to suicide).
50. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
51. Id. at 3058 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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He has strong words for those Justices ready to identify new rights
based on such First Principles, accusing members of the Court
supporting the result in Lawrence, for example, of “tak[ing] sides in
52
the culture war,” “sign[ing] on to the so-called homosexual
53
agenda,” and risking “massive disruption of the current social
54
order.” This critique is possible only from the standpoint that
tradition is objectively discernible and unchanging. Indeed, Justice
Scalia believes that the historical method is so reliable that it should
be the “primary determinant of what the Constitution means”—even,
55
say, the Equal Protection Clause.
Another feature of this historical method is that, because
tradition is frozen, Court rulings based on it are permanent. In
Cruzan, for example, Justice Scalia made clear that there is no right,
now, or at any time in the future, to challenge any state regulation
regarding end-of-life matters. Regardless of the facts of the case,
changed circumstances, or evolving attitudes since early common law,
this line of rights is a permanent dead end in the courts. Tradition sets
56
the course. “[F]ederal courts have no business in this field . . . .”
57
“[T]he Constitution has nothing to say about the subject.” Period.
2. The Critique.
Notwithstanding the appeal of a fixed,
discernible view of tradition as a limiting principle for substantive due
process, tradition does not provide an objective basis for deciding
substantive due process claims. As will be examined more fully in
Part II, tradition cannot serve that role because of its inherently fluid
and evasive characteristics. Tradition is not fixed, nor can it be easily
or reliably retrieved. It represents not fixed facts, but accumulated
values that cannot be ascertained through some precise, scientific
method. Perhaps most especially, tradition cannot be determined
solely by looking at the past. It is, instead, an iterative phenomenon

52. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 591; see also id. at 586–92 (arguing that Lawrence was much more likely to cause
disruption of social order than the overruling of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), would have
caused in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), even
though avoiding such disorder was used as a justification for Casey’s refusal to overrule Roe, see
Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 (plurality opinion)).
55. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 505, 570, 574–75 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 300.
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that accumulates over time, with repeated affirmations, revisions, and
instantiations.
Justice Scalia’s opinions, themselves, reflect the flexibility
offered by the categories upon which he relies to create certainty. To
take just one example, Justice Scalia opposed the biological father’s
claim to paternal rights in Michael H. because that claim was contrary
to the interests of the unitary family—the mother, husband, and
58
59
child. Yet in the later case of Troxel v. Granville, Justice Scalia
voted to reject the right of parents in a unitary family to resist
visitation by third-party grandparents under a Washington statute
allowing such visitation if the court concludes that it is in the child’s
60
best interests.
One might conclude that Justice Scalia is consistent in that he
simply rejects the identification of new constitutional rights when
doing so would defeat the will of legislatures. This consistency is
belied, however, by Justice Scalia’s willingness in McDonald to sign
on to the majority’s identification of a right to possess handguns in
one’s own home on the basis of historical evidence no more or less
mixed than the evidence in cases in which he rejected substantive due
process claims. McDonald concerned a Chicago law restricting the
possession of handguns. The question in McDonald was whether the
Second Amendment right to bear arms is so sufficiently fundamental
to our “scheme of ordered liberty” that it should be incorporated as a
matter of substantive due process to invalidate the restrictions in
61
question. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Alito purported to
track Justice Scalia’s approach in Lawrence, Michael H., and Cruzan.
“The relationship between the Bill of Rights’ guarantees and the
62
States must be governed by a single, neutral principle”—tradition.
Yet here, instead of defining the claimed right and applicable
precedent narrowly to defeat the claim, Justice Alito defined the
claimed right—and the tradition upon which it is based—broadly, as
63
64
the “right to keep and bear arms” and the right to self-defense, in

58. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989) (plurality opinion).
59. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
60. Id. at 91–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas suggested that he would have gone
further and overruled the Court’s substantive due process decisions as exceeding the “original
understanding of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
61. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 149 (1986)).
62. Id. at 3048 (plurality opinion).
63. Id. at 3042 (majority opinion).
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order to uphold the claim. These are rights, Justice Alito wrote, that
“the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment
counted . . . among those fundamental rights necessary to our system
65
of ordered liberty.” And whereas judicial interest balancing is
ordinarily inappropriate and deference to legislative interests to
66
determine the will of the people is paramount, in McDonald—which
involved gun rights—these interests must bow to the Court’s
understanding of the meaning of the broad rights of self-defense that
it identifies.
Justice Alito, like Justice Scalia, writes with a certitude in
substantive due process cases that is not unrelated to the particular
view of tradition upon which this certitude is based. If tradition is
discernible and unchangeable, it can be reliably and objectively
identified. It is difficult to escape, though, the amount of discretion
these conservative Justices exercise when deciding whether or not a
right is, or is not, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.
In Michael H. and Bowers, Justices White and Scalia defined
narrowly the claim and the relevant tradition so that they did not
67
match, as discussed above, notwithstanding other ways that both the
claim and the tradition might have been characterized. In McDonald,
Justice Alito defined the claimed right broadly—as a “right of selfdefense” and the “right to keep and bear arms.” So defined, this right
matched perfectly the broad statements he had retrieved from
constitutional ratification debates and various secondary sources
68
about these same rights, and made the long and more detailed
history of restrictions on gun ownership described in Justice Breyer’s
69
dissenting opinion seem irrelevant. It is this kind of slipperiness that
leaves this method vulnerable to the frequent criticism that it creates

64. Id. at 3036.
65. Id. at 3042; see also id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring) (characterizing the incorporation
of the Second Amendment right to bear arms as a “straightforward application of settled
doctrine”).
66. See id. at 3047 (plurality opinion) (explaining that “judicial interest balancing” was
expressly rejected by the Court in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008)).
67. See supra notes 35–42 and accompanying text.
68. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036–42 (majority opinion).
69. Compare id. at 3036–44 (relying on general statements in favor of the historical right to
keep and bear arms), with id. at 3120–38 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (providing an extensive list of
specific gun regulations).
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plenty of openings for judges to “smuggle[]” their personal
70
preferences into substantive due process analysis.
The failure to engage alternative histories and traditions gives
weight to the general observation some have made that originalism is
less a coherent or compelling jurisprudence than a “political practice”
that seeks “to forge a vibrant connection between the Constitution
71
and contemporary conservative values.” The point is neither that the
values identified by conservatives are wrong, nor that some other
method would be more objective. It is, rather, that Originalists make
false claims about the nature of tradition. To be supported by
72
tradition, properly understood, values must not only be rooted in the
past but must also resonate today. That resonance needs to be
justified, not preemptively accepted as yesterday’s truth.
For the same reason, contemporary standards alone do not offer
a more objective or more satisfying basis for substantive due process
decisions. Section B explores a jurisprudence that leans too heavily
on the present, to the exclusion of the past.

70. See id. at 3118 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] limitless number of subjective judgments
may be smuggled into [Justice Scalia’s] historical analysis.”); id. at 3116–17 (challenging the
neutrality of Justice Scalia’s historical method and noting the inherently subjective process of
framing an issue and selecting and synthesizing historical sources). This criticism parallels
similar objections by Justices in other cases. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 137
(1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The pretense is seductive; it would be comforting to believe
that a search for ‘tradition’ involves nothing more idiosyncratic or complicated than poring
through dusty volumes on American history.”). Even Justices who, too, have applied a narrow
“historical” version of substantive due process dispute its objectivity when they disagree about a
result. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 549 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)
(“What the deeply rooted traditions of the country are is arguable, which of them deserve the
protection of the Due Process Clause is even more debatable.”); see also Bartlett, supra note 9,
at 318–19 (arguing that the tradition is not an objective standard, but instead has been used to
advance a particular substantive agenda); Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE
L.J. 177, 221 (1993) (“Tradition is no longer, if it ever was, the powerful iconic beacon of
societal truth, but is more accurately an apologia invoked to defend some predetermined (and
unacknowledged) choice.”); cf. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as Political Practice:
The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 569 (2006) (arguing that originalism
is a political practice rather than a compelling jurisprudence); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C.
Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1066 (1990)
(arguing that the level of generality of claimed rights in substantive due process analysis is often
based on conclusions judges seek to reach).
71. See Post & Siegel, supra note 70, at 569.
72. See infra Part II.
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B. Tradition as “Steeped in Prejudice and Superstition”
1. The Model. If some conservative Justices believe in a fixed,
unmediated past suited as a sole guide for individual-liberty rights,
some liberal Justices have been overly dismissive of the past, while at
the same time sharing with the conservative Justices a view of
tradition as distinct from and contrary to present norms and
circumstances. Justice Brennan exemplifies this dichotomous,
antitradition view. Although this theory of tradition is less developed
than that of Justice Scalia, to Justice Brennan, a Constitution whose
interpretation is tied to tradition is “a stagnant, archaic, hidebound
document steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a time long
73
past.” Justice Ginsburg believes, as well, that tradition represents
74
this nation’s “long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination”
and outdated, “fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of
75
males and females.”
Because these liberal views tend to associate tradition with
injustice rather than with fundamental freedoms, those who hold
these views do not believe that the Court should be bound by
76
tradition in giving meaning to substantive due process. Tradition is
not the anchor for constitutional liberty interests, but, in many cases,
its antithesis. Thus, although in his opinions Justice Brennan is
sometimes able to identify a tradition supporting a substantive due
77
process claim, the ultimate question for him is not whether a specific
right has always been protected but whether, guided “by our prior
cases and by common sense,” a particular claim is “close enough to
the interests that we already have protected to be deemed an aspect
78
of ‘liberty’ as well.” Justice Blackmun, similarly, insists in his
opinions that substantive due process is not about “blind imitation of

73. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)).
75. Id. at 541–42 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
76. This thought is often attributed to Justice Holmes. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) (“It is revolting to have no better reason for
a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.”).
77. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 305 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citing common-law tort principles of trespass and battery as evidence that the right
to be free from unwanted medical attention is deeply rooted).
78. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the past” but rather about determining the values that underlie the
80
Court’s prior precedents.
In determining whether a liberty interest should be extended, the
Court’s most liberal members tend to characterize claims broadly, to
facilitate connections with relevant precedents and thereby support
expanded individual rights. For example, whereas Justices White and
Scalia viewed the claims at issue in Bowers and Lawrence as the
“right to engage in homosexual sodomy,” Justice Blackmun saw it
more broadly as the right of individuals “‘to be let alone’ . . . to decide
for themselves whether to engage in particular forms of private,
81
consensual sexual activity.” Similarly, whereas Justice Scalia treated
the issue in Cruzan specifically as the lawfulness of the state
82
“interfer[ing] with bodily integrity to prevent a felony,” including
suicide, Justice Brennan addressed the “right to be free from medical
83
attention without consent.”
The Justices who refuse to be governed by a stationary view of
tradition also tend to construe traditions and prior precedents more
broadly. Thus, whereas Justices White and Scalia in Bowers and
Lawrence looked only to the existence of antisodomy laws at the time
of the Framers and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Justice Blackmun in Bowers rejected early law as a basis to deny
84
freedom in the present, and generously interpreted prior Court
precedents to protect such things as “a way of life,” “harmony in
living,” “the ability independently to define one’s identity,”
“development of the human personality,” “giving individuals freedom
to choose how to conduct their lives,” and “special protection for the
85
individual in his home.” In Michael H., whereas Justice Scalia cited

79. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting
Holmes, supra note 76, at 469) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
80. Id.; see also id. at 210 (“[N]either the length of time a majority has held its convictions
[n]or the passions with which it defends them can withdraw legislation from this Court’s
scrutiny.”).
81. Id. at 199 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)).
82. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 298 (Scalia, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
790 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgments) (stating that the issue raised by
Washington’s ban on physician-assisted suicide is the “right to die with dignity” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
84. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199, 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 205–07; see also id. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (looking broadly to the
“American heritage of freedom,” which consists of “the abiding interest in individual liberty
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early common law relating the presumption of legitimacy and
narrowly construed Supreme Court precedents to apply to the
86
“unitary family,” Justice Brennan interpreted those precedents to
87
support the rights of parents and families, broadly defined. These
precedents, for Justice Brennan, demonstrate that our society is not a
homogeneous one that recognizes only one legitimate family form,
88
but rather a facilitative and pluralistic one. In the end, for Justice
89
Brennan, the general tradition in support of parenthood is the more
important tradition to emphasize in determining “the kind of society”
90
we are, and wish to be.
Whereas the historical method favored by Justice Scalia and
other conservative Justices makes changed circumstances irrelevant
to substantive due process, the more liberal Justices believe that the
Court should take changed circumstances into account in deciding
what values and rights are fundamental to our way of life. In the
context of the conclusive presumption at issue in Michael H., for
example, Justice Brennan pointed out that blood tests now exist that
can determine paternity virtually beyond a shadow of a doubt,
making it unnecessary to achieve the necessary certainty through a
91
legal fiction. Likewise, in considering the right to physician-assisted
suicide, Justice Brennan found relevant the vastly increased
availability of life-prolonging medical technologies, current medical
practices relating to use of heroic measures, and the growing use of
living wills and health-care powers of attorney—all of which change
the context in which expectations relating to patient control of end92
of-life decisions are evolving.
Because tradition requires interpretation, not simple retrieval,
reason and judgment are an important part of the liberal
methodology. Justice Brennan reasoned in Cruzan, for example, that
although the state has a legitimate interest in preserving life, it can
have “no legitimate general interest in someone’s life, completely

that makes certain state intrusions on the citizen’s right to decide how he will live his own life
intolerable” (citations omitted)).
86. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123–25 (1989) (plurality opinion).
87. Id. at 137–47 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 141.
89. Id. at 139.
90. Id. at 141.
91. Id. at 140.
92. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 314, 320–25 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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abstracted from the interest of the person living that life.” Justice
Brennan explained why a person would not want to continue on life
support (pride, abhorrence of an “ignoble end,” humiliation, desire
94
for dignity); why Missouri’s rule was counterproductive (it will make
doctors and families more reluctant to initiate life-sustaining
measures that they then will not be allowed to terminate, even at the
95
family’s request); why, although a living will may be the only way to
satisfy Missouri’s requirements, most people do not make living wills
(a wish to avoid dwelling on their own “deterioration and mortality,”
96
a lack of awareness of how to create a living will); and why
Missouri’s failure to recognize testimony from family and friends
about what a patient would have wanted makes factfinding less,
97
rather than more, reliable (usually no one knows the patient better).
In contrast to Justice Scalia’s reliance on tradition divorced of its
underlying rationale or any countervailing, contemporary norms and
values, what counted for Justice Brennan’s opinion were general
propositions that found support in precedent, reason, and present
circumstances.
Justice Ginsburg shares Justice Brennan’s skeptical view toward
tradition, but the two Justices differ in their treatment of substantive
due process. Whereas Justice Brennan attempted to use substantive
due process largely set free from tradition in favor of the expansion of
individual liberty rights, Justice Ginsburg has never fully embraced
substantive due process as an independent source of individual
98
rights. In cases decided in favor of substantive due process claims,
Justice Ginsburg has mostly signed on to opinions written by others
99
rather than authored her own. When she has written for the
majority, her approach to substantive due process has been to extend

93. Id. at 313; see also id. (reasoning that there are no third parties whose situation will be
improved, or for whom harm will be averted, as a result of the state’s denial of Nancy Cruzan’s
parents’ request).
94. Id. at 310–12.
95. Id. at 314.
96. Id. at 323–25.
97. Id. at 325.
98. For a similar observation, see Pamela S. Karlan, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and
Equality in Relation to Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1086 (2009) (“Justice
Ginsburg has continued to resist the temptation to use substantive due process . . . .”).
99. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 59 (2000) (joining Justice O’Connor’s
plurality opinion); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 789 (1997) (Ginsburg, J., concurring
in the judgments) (concurring for essentially the same reasons as Justice O’Connor).

BARTLETT IN PRINTER PROOF REVISED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

12/4/2012 2:55 PM

TRADITION IN SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

553

100

past decisions based on logic and evolving norms. Given the choice,
however, Justice Ginsburg has long favored equal protection over
101
substantive due process analysis. The right to abortion, she states,
would have been more secure on a foundation that incorporated the
102
importance of the abortion decision to women’s equality. To Justice
Ginsburg, autonomy and equality concerns are “intimately related,”
103
with equality concerns the dominant ones. Accordingly, in resisting
100. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116–17 (1996) (finding unconstitutional on due
process grounds the state’s denial of a mother’s right to appeal the termination of her parental
rights when she could not pay the $2,400 record-preparation fee).
101. The conventional analysis is that substantive due process looks backward to protect
established individual liberties against what Professor Sunstein calls “short-run departures” or
“shortsighted deviations” from tradition, while equal protection looks forward, to invalidate
practices, “however deeply engrained and longstanding,” that are determined to discriminate
against disadvantaged groups. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note
on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163,
1171 (1988). By Sunstein’s view, substantive due process constitutes a limit on “dramatic and
insufficiently reasoned change,” id. at 1171, while equal protection operates as a “criticism of
existing practice”—a “protect[ion] against tradition[]” that is “self-consciously designed to
eliminate practices that existed at the time of ratification . . . that were expected to endure.” Id.
at 1174. Professor Laurence Tribe has made a similar contrast between the “properly
conservative and suitably backward-looking” substantive due process doctrine and the “more
aspirational domain of equal protection.” Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The
“Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1897 (2004).
This distinction, while it may seem to help distinguish many cases, imposes a false dichotomy
between past and present. In fact, a number of scholars in recent years, including Professor
Tribe himself, have challenged this dichotomous view of substantive due process and equal
protection, arguing that the two doctrines actually protect a convergent set of rights relating to
dignity and self-government. See id., at 1897 (“Trying to make sense of the conclusions judges
have reached by attending carefully to the rulings they have actually rendered in the name of
substantive due process reveals a very different narrative. It is a narrative in which due process
and equal protection . . . are profoundly interlocked in a legal double helix. It is a single,
unfolding tale of equal liberty and increasingly universal dignity. This tale centers on a quest for
genuine self-government of groups small and large, from the most intimate to the most
impersonal.”); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749 (2011)
(“The introduction of a third overarching term like ‘dignity’ that acknowledges the links
between liberty and equality is overdue. Too much emphasis has been placed on the formal
distinction between the equality claims made under the equal protection guarantees and the
liberty claims made under the due process or other guarantees.”). This convergent view is
wholly consistent with an interactive view of past and present that evaluates past norms and
practices in light of current commitments, including commitments to equality, and that evaluates
present norms and practice in light of the traditions that give them shape and meaning.
102. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 382–86 (1985).
103. Id. at 375 (arguing that “the shape of the law on gender-based classification and
reproductive autonomy indicates and influences the opportunity women will have to participate
as men’s full partners in the nation’s social, political, and economic life”). This view was
included as part of the reasoning in Casey, although Justice Ginsburg was not a member of the
Court when that decision was rendered. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
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the Court’s retrenchment in the area of women’s reproductive rights,
Justice Ginsburg has veered away from the reasoning of an evolving
substantive due process analysis. In her dissent in Gonzales v.
104
Carhart, she cited the Court’s prior substantive due process cases as
precedent, but invoked none of the reasoning supporting these
105
precedents. Indeed, she denied that the case was about “some
generalized notion of privacy,” instead shifting the right at stake to
the “woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to
106
enjoy equal citizenship stature.”
Justice Ginsburg uses her view of the past as oppressive in an
affirmative way in her equal protection jurisprudence. In United
107
States v. Virginia, for example, Justice Ginsburg used the history of
public education in Virginia to refute Virginia’s defense of its
exclusion of women from the Virginia Military Institute (VMI).
Virginia’s claim was that the availability of the male-only VMI
enhanced educational diversity in Virginia. In response, Justice
Ginsburg pointed to Virginia’s tradition of excluding women from its
institutions of higher learning to show that preserving VMI as an allmale institution was part of a historical pattern of discrimination
108
rather than a commitment to the benefits of educational diversity.
Virginia also claimed that the admission of women would undermine
the strengths of the adversative training offered at VMI, because the
same techniques could not be used in mixed company and would not
work for women. Justice Ginsburg again recited historical facts to
refute the claim: the U.S. military academies in response to the same
skepticism successfully integrated women in the 1970s; if they could
109
do so without compromising their rigor, so could VMI.
833, 852 (1992) (plurality opinion) (“The destiny of the woman must be shaped . . . on her own
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.”).
104. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
105. Id. at 191 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Even in the course of citing the Court’s precedents,
Justice Ginsburg emphasizes that her preferred rationale focuses on women’s equality interests,
not the substantive due process rights on which those precedents are based. See id. (stating that
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006), “cannot be understood as
anything other than an effort to chip away at a right declared again and again by this Court—
and with increasing comprehension of its centrality to women’s lives”).
106. Id. at 172.
107. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
108. Id. at 536–40; see also id. at 538 (“[T]he historical record indicates [that the exclusion of
women from the VMI was] more deliberate than anomalous.”).
109. Id. at 540–45, 551 (citing concerns of those who defended the exclusion of women from
military academies and from the practice of law, and noting that these concerns have not come
to pass); see also id. at 555 n.20 (stating that Virginia’s concern about the adversative training
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2. The Critique. Although Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and
Ginsburg undertake a wholly different kind of substantive due
process analysis than Justices White, Scalia, and Alito, their approach
reflects a similar misunderstanding of tradition. Justice Brennan
concedes that tradition is not “irrelevant” in substantive due process
110
cases, yet his method of focusing on present realities and his
consistently broad characterization of rights and precedents leaves
little room for consideration of the role of the past in determining
what rights are fundamental to our identity, or in securing those rights
through connections to the past. According to Justice Brennan,
tradition is a “theme” in prior cases, but it is the precedents
themselves, as new facts present themselves, that provide the
111
authority to move forward. Justice Ginsburg, too, sees tradition in a
discontinuous way—fixed and unrelated to the present. Tradition is
more a source of injustice than liberty. Like Justices Scalia and Alito,
these Justices, too, fail to recognize the common process through
which tradition is preserved and change occurs—namely, through an
ongoing, inevitable process of selective transmissions from the past
that are accepted and integrated into present norms under changing
circumstances. They see past and present as competitive rather than
interactive and potentially complementary.
The dichotomous view of past and present not only is inaccurate,
but it also prevents meaningful debate about basic questions of
constitutional values. It is, in short, a conversation stopper. By
rejecting the factors that mean the most to the other, the approaches
of both ends of the Court are conversation stoppers. They reach
conclusions about the most basic issues relating to personal identity,
freedom, and liberty on their own, exclusive terms—terms that allow
no meaningful mutual exchange between the two sides. In focusing on
only the past or the present, these approaches not only fail to speak to

method destroying a sense of decency between the sexes “is an ancient and familiar fear”). For
a fuller analysis of Justice Ginsburg’s use of history, see Deborah A. Widiss, Note, Re-Viewing
History: The Use of the Past as Negative Precedent in United States v. Virginia, 108 YALE L.J.
237, 245–59 (1998).
110. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 139 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It is
not that tradition has been irrelevant to our prior decisions.”).
111. Id. at 139 (“Throughout our decisionmaking in this important area runs the theme that
certain interests and practices . . . form the core of our definition of ‘liberty.’ . . . In deciding
cases arising under the Due Process Clause, . . . we have considered whether the concrete
limitation under consideration impermissibly impinges upon one of these more generalized
interests.”).
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each other but also to the Court’s center, which tends to be more
interested in the links between past and present.
II. BEYOND THE PAST/PRESENT DICHOTOMY
The two views of tradition described in Part I are nearly
diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive, reaching different
conclusions through different starting points and methodologies. As
such, they provide little common ground for discussion about what
fundamental rights deserve constitutional protection under
substantive due process. They are ships passing in the night. The
problem is not simply that the Justices disagree about starting
points—conservatives preferring past tradition and liberals preferring
contemporary norms and reasoned judgment. It is that both sides
view these different starting points as polar opposites, each unrelated
to the other. These understandings create disputed territory between
the Justices that is impassable. Conservatives believe that only deeply
rooted traditions are relevant and that these traditions have no
relation to current norms and values. Liberals, on the other hand,
believe that reasoned judgment is what matters most and that
tradition adds little—except perhaps window dressing—to this
judgment. What one side finds dispositive is entirely irrelevant to the
other. These are not the makings of a meaningful constitutional
112
discourse.
A. An Integrative View of Past and Present: The Model
There is a way to think about tradition that better captures the
dynamics of tradition and thereby provides a more satisfactory guide
to substantive due process analysis. This alternative view sees past
and present as in motion and as part of a negotiation about who we
are and what freedoms and liberties matter to us enough to have
113
constitutional status. Tradition is a connection or link between past
114
and present, rather than a choice between them. The past is what
112. Cf. Olympia J. Snowe, Opinion, How the Public Can Save the Senate, WASH. POST,
Mar. 4, 2012 at A23 (describing Senator Olympia Snowe’s reasons for leaving the U.S. Senate,
including the failure of leaders to find common ground and to live up to the Founding Fathers’
intentions for establishing the “greatest deliberative body in history”).
113. Bartlett, supra note 9, at 330; see also SHEILA ROWBOTHAM, THE PAST IS BEFORE US:
FEMINISM IN ACTION SINCE THE 1960S, at 301 (1989) (arguing that “the future is behind us
and . . . the past really is before us”).
114. For a discussion of common law and custom as the “extension of a pre-existing series,”
in which “the agent who extends the series has, in theory, a range of options about the extension
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the present redeems from its history; the present is what the present
claims as its own.
This richer view of tradition understands that traditions are
115
multiple and varied, and do not speak with just one voice. Often
traditions are “indeterminate, self-contradictory, incalculable,
116
inexplicable, and generally elusive.” They are also found in multiple
places, such as social practices, norms, and expectations—not simply
in older versions of the very same legal rules and proscriptions that a
117
lawsuit challenges.
A value or practice from the past earns recognition as a tradition
when society chooses to bring it forward from the past into the
present. In this sense, tradition is an inheritance, upon which a kind of
118
evolutionary pressure is continually exerted,
causing past
commitments to be amended and reworked, in potentially creative
119
ways. Deciding what constitutional rights should be protected by
substantive due process is a matter of determining consciously,
transparently, and respectfully what part of its past traditions the
present should own for itself, and what it should not. This is not the
kind of exercise that can be performed by a single, straightforward
120
reading of historical evidence.
If tradition requires choices, it also requires constraints—both
methodological and temperamental. Methodologically, the concept of
tradition assumes that a people’s sense of identity changes not in
sudden bursts but in incremental and iterative stages. Accordingly,
judicial decisionmaking that builds on tradition is gradualist and
minimalist. This means that decisions should be limited to the facts
of that series,” see Frederick Schauer, Pitfalls in the Interpretation of Customary Law, in THE
NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW 13, 23–24 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard Murphy
eds., 2007). A similar concept, discussed by Professor Schauer, is Professor Ronald Dworkin’s
metaphor for interpretation of the “chain novel.” See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228–
38 (1986).
115. See Krygier, supra note 6, at 242 (“[E]ven in constantly vetted traditions such as law,
the past speaks with many voices.”).
116. Brown, supra note 70 at 222.
117. Bartlett, supra note 9, at 314.
118. See F.A. HAYEK, The Origins and Effects of Our Morals: A Problem for Science, in
THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK 318, 318 (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube eds., 1984) (explaining
his view that “cultural evolution operates chiefly through group selection”).
119. Krygier, supra note 6, at 256.
120. See Rebecca L. Brown, History for the Non-Originalist, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 69,
71 (2003) (“The kinds of questions that tend to arise in constitutional interpretation, and on
which historical evidence might be helpful, tend not to be the kinds of questions that can aspire
to truth.”).
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directly before the court and should not preclude future
decisionmaking in contexts that may implicate different values and
considerations.
Temperamentally, this view of tradition calls for prudence,
caution, and humility. Judges determining whether a fundamental
constitutional right has emerged are obliged to try in good faith to set
aside their own subjective values, in favor of those evident in both our
121
inherited past and our evolving present. This requires “judgment”
from “judicial statesmen” with both practical and social wisdom and
an ability to understand the competing considerations that underlie
122
the potentially relevant values.
A number of constitutional-law scholars have developed theories
of constitutional interpretation that take seriously the interaction
between past and present in a way that is consistent with these
methodological and temperamental limits. Dean Larry Kramer, for
example, critiques the “originalist” view of constitutional
interpretation on the grounds that it assumes that “[t]here are
Founding moments and the present—then and now—and little
123
else.” In this critique, Dean Kramer argues that it is the job of
interpreters of the Constitution to determine which competing
interpretations of the Constitution make sense in light of what has
happened since the Founding moments. “Subsequent history is
essential to determine what our Constitution has become and to
decide what it should continue becoming”—an inquiry that is both
“grounded in the present” but also based on the “best sense” we can
124
make of the “‘web of beliefs and practices’ we have inherited.” In
seeing the act of interpretation as a synthesis of past and present,
Kramer eschews the notion that interpretation chooses between the
two.

121. Professor Jeff Powell makes the case that historical research itself requires the
“constant exercise of judgment.” H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659,
660 (1987); see also id. at 683 (arguing that “[h]istory yields interpretations, not uninterpreted
facts”).
122. See Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 979 (2008)
(“[S]tatesmanship charges judges with approaching cases so as to facilitate the ability of the
legal order to legitimate itself over the long term by . . . expressing social values as social
circumstances change and sustaining social solidarity amidst reasonable, irreconcilable
disagreement.”).
123. Kramer, supra note 17, at 1628.
124. Id. at 1641 (quoting DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT
THEORY 22–23 (1980)).
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Scholars as otherwise diverse as Professors Ernest Young, Cass
126
127
Sunstein, and David Strauss have linked this more synthetic
notion of tradition in various ways with the thought of Edmund
Burke. Professor Young advocates a “conservative” or
“evolutionary” view of constitutional interpretation that he calls
“common-law constitutionalism,” which approaches constitutional
interpretation like other forms of common-law reasoning, starting
with precedent as a “source of knowledge,” and responding to
changing circumstances with “slow, incremental change” as opposed
128
to “radical transformations.” Within this framework, tradition is not
a fixed source of authority; rather, it is “determined from case-by-case
adjudication, from judgments of similarity and difference to what has
gone before—in short, from the tradition of readings and rereadings
of authoritative materials that constitute the practice of constitutional
129
stare decisis.”
Professor Young argues that Burke rejects rigid adherence to
some originalist understanding at some discrete point in time of the
130
sort advocated by Justices Scalia and Thomas.
Burke also
“downplays the efficacy of a priori rationalizations about law and
131
132
133
justice,” “naked reason,” and “abstract notions of justice”
toward which opponents of tradition gravitate. Instead, Burke urges
134
respecting the “lessons of history” over time, using “precedent, legal
135
reasoning, collective deliberation,” and “reasoned judgment.”

125. See Young, supra note 14 (arguing that modern judicial conservatism is anathema to
the classically conservative political theory articulated in the writings of Edmund Burke).
126. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 353 (arguing that Burkean judicial philosophies oppose
originalism).
127. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 885 n.23 (advocating a theory, which he identifies as less
conservative than Burke’s, in which interpretations of the Constitution are driven both by the
text and by a continually developing body of constitutional common law).
128. Young, supra note 14, at 622, 624, 688–89. For a critique of common-law
constitutionalism, see generally Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the
Limits of Reason, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482 (2007), which argues that common-law
constitutionalism is no more rational or efficient than statutes and other sources of law.
129. Young, supra note 14, at 700 (quoting Balkin, supra note 31, at 1624) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
130. Id. at 627–42.
131. Id. at 624.
132. Id. at 648.
133. Id. at 704.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 694 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992)
(plurality opinion)).
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Professor Sunstein also praises Burkean minimalists, who unlike
either originalists or perfectionists, “believe that constitutional
principles must be built incrementally and by analogy, with close
136
reference to long-standing practices.” Professor Sunstein links this
form of gradualist minimalism with the restraint that judges refrain
from deciding cases broadly and deeply, instead deciding one case at
137
a time based on the facts before the court. Similarly, Professor
Strauss applauds “rational traditionalism,” which “calls for
recognizing the value of conclusions that have been arrived at, over
138
time, by an evolutionary process.” Rationalist traditionalism gives
139
140
the “benefit of the doubt” to past practice and text, but it tempers
that deference with moral judgments about fairness, good policy, and
social utility, which “have always played a role in the common law,
and have generally been recognized as a legitimate part of common
141
law judging.”
A highly influential statement of this view of tradition is Justice
142
Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, a substantive due
process case in which the Court declined to invalidate a state’s ban on
143
contraceptives.
In his dissent, Justice Harlan famously
conceptualized a Burkean view of tradition that both respects the past

136. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 356. Professor Sunstein’s taxonomy distinguishes Burkean
minimalists from originalists, who seek to recover the original meaning of the Constitution,
from rationalist minimalists, who favor incremental steps but are often critical of tradition, and
from perfectionists, who want to read the Constitution to accord with the highest political ideals
(whether liberal or conservative). Id. Professor Daniel Conkle seems to suggest a similar
theoretical breakdown in distinguishing between the “theory of historical tradition” upon which
Justice White relies in Bowers and other decisions, the “theory of reasoned judgment”
represented by the jurisprudence of Justice Blackmun in Roe and his dissent in Bowers, and the
“theory of evolving national values” followed by Justice Kennedy in Lawrence, see Daniel O.
Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63 (2006). None of
Professor Conkle’s formulations are Burkean, however, in the sense that none of them combine
tradition and reasoned judgment; instead, they each accept one version or another of the
tradition-change dichotomy.
137. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 10–11 (1999) (“They decide the case at hand; they do not decide other cases
too, except to the extent that one decision necessarily bears on other cases, and unless they are
pretty much forced to do so.”).
138. Strauss, supra note 16, at 879.
139. Id. at 895.
140. Id. at 897.
141. Id. at 900.
142. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
143. The case was abrogated four years later by Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487
(1965).
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and recognizes its inevitably dynamic and evolving nature.
“[T]radition is a living thing,” he wrote, representing the balance that
our nation has struck between the “postulates of respect for the
144
liberty of the individual” and “the demands of organized society.”
This liberty is not fixed as “a series of isolated points pricked out” in
145
various areas, but is rather “a rational continuum.” Within this
continuum, there are choices to be made between the traditions
“from which [this nation] has developed” and “the traditions from
146
which it broke.” Some traditions are worth preserving while others
should be discarded. The necessity of choice does not mean that
judges are “free to roam where unguided speculation might take
147
them,” or to give rein to their “merely personal and private
148
notions.” The Court must respect tradition, for pragmatic as well as
prudential reasons. Decisions that show such respect are “likely to be
sound,” whereas those “which radically depart[] from it could not
149
150
long survive.” Judgment and restraint are critical components.
Each new claim should be “considered against a background of
Constitutional purposes, as they have been rationally perceived and
historically developed. . . . The new decision must take ‘its place in
relation to what went before and further [cut] a channel for what is to
151
come.’”
This more dynamic, interactive view of tradition is both more
open-ended and generative than conservatives allow, and more
constrained than many liberals assume. The next Section
demonstrates its application.
B. The Interactive View of Past and Present: Applications
Justice Harlan’s integrative view of tradition and liberty has
formed the basis for a number of Supreme Court opinions in recent
decades. The view of tradition reflected in these opinions is not
outcome dispositive, in the sense that some of the opinions upheld
state statutes against substantive due process attacks, while others
144. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 543.
146. Id. at 542.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 544 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952)).
149. Id. at 542.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 544 (quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 147 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)) (last alteration in original).
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invalidated such statutes. This Section analyzes opinions in three
distinct subject-matter areas: (1) end-of-life decisionmaking, (2)
private sexual behavior between individuals of the same sex, and (3)
grandparent visitation. In each of these areas, I identify the features
of the opinions that reflect an interactive view of past tradition and
current norms, and suggest the benefits of this view.
1. End-of-Life Decisionmaking.
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
majority opinion in Cruzan held that a state may constitutionally
prohibit withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment unless there
is clear and convincing evidence that the incompetent person would
152
have wanted such withdrawal. Two of the opinions in this case—
153
already discussed —either gave dispositive weight to history (Justice
Scalia) or virtually ignored history altogether (Justice Brennan). The
other opinions, in different ways and in various degrees, took a more
nuanced approach.
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in Cruzan, directly took
on the historical methodology employed by Justice Scalia, and in so
doing, provides the fullest expression of a more interactive view of
past and present. Issues of the magnitude raised in the case, he wrote,
cannot be settled by categorical principles. The questions of
“whether, and how, the Constitution protects the liberty of seriously
ill patients to be free from life-sustaining medical treatment” should
154
155
not be resolved “in the abstract.” Concrete details matter. History
also matters, but it does not always provide consistent or controlling
signals. In this particular case, Justice Stevens pointed out that the
156
“[d]ecisions about prolongation of life are of recent origin.” History
about life-sustaining medical treatment could hardly be dispositive
when it is the case that “[f]or most of the world’s history . . . such
decisions would never arise because the technology would not be
157
available.” Medical advances have created a new problem, changing
the circumstances under which any historical precedent might be
dispositive, or even relevant.

152. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286–87 (1990).
153. See supra notes 40–42, 46, 49, 56–57, 82–83, 92–97 and accompanying text.
154. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. See id. (“Our responsibility as judges both enables and compels us to treat the problem
as it is illuminated by the facts of the controversy before us.”).
156. Id. at 336 (quoting Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 428 (Mo. 1988) (Blackmar, J.,
dissenting), aff’d sub nom. Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)).
157. Id. (quoting Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 428 (Blackmar, J., dissenting)).
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The issue of constitutional rights in this arena was complicated
for Justice Stevens by the difficulty of describing the “precise
158
constitutional significance of death.” According to Justice Stevens,
the rights that attend end-of-life decisions are not “reducible to a
159
protection against batteries undertaken in the name of treatment,”
as Justice Brennan suggested, nor do they necessitate a rejection of
160
the value of or “desire for life,” as Justice Scalia claimed. It is
impossible to categorize death in a way that easily disposes of the
issue in the case because “not much may be said with confidence
161
about death.” Indeed, the sanctity of life, including when it begins
and ends, “is often thought to derive from the impossibility” of
reducing it to a single measure like a physiological condition or
162
function. What can be said, as with other questions that may depend
163
upon when life begins, is as much a question of “faith” as anything
164
else. For Justice Stevens, this fact “alone is reason enough to protect
the freedom to conform choices about death to individual
165
conscience.”
While he reached a different result, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, used reasoning more consistent with that of
Justice Stevens than Justice Scalia. After surveying the common law
relating to a competent person’s liberty interest in terminating
medical treatment, the Chief Justice was concerned about extending
the “logic” of prior cases to the refusal of treatment by an adult’s
166
patient parents, because of “the dramatic consequences involved.”
In considering these consequences, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted the
“commitment to life” of “all civilized nations” evident in treating
homicide as a serious crime and of the majority of states in

158. Id. at 343.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 345–46.
163. See id. at 343–50.
164. Id. at 343.
165. Id.; see also id. at 350 (“[T]here is no reasonable ground for believing that Nancy Beth
Cruzan has any personal interest in the perpetuation of what the State has decided is her
life. . . . [I]t would be possible to hypothesize such an interest on the basis of theological or
philosophical conjecture. But even to posit such a basis for the State’s action is to condemn it. It
is not within the province of secular government to circumscribe the liberties of the people by
regulations designed wholly for the purpose of establishing a sectarian definition of life.”).
166. Id. at 279 (majority opinion).
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criminalizing assisted suicide. In view of this backdrop, the Chief
Justice concluded that a state’s desire to guard against potential
abuses by requiring a determination regarding an incompetent’s
wishes, as well as its refusal “to make judgments about the ‘quality’ of
life that a particular individual may enjoy,” is not constitutionally
168
unreasonable.
All along the way, Chief Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged the variety of sources, past and present, from which
169
substantive due process rights might emerge, as well as the
170
important values at stake on both sides of the issue.
In agreeing with the majority, Justice O’Connor, too, was not
able to find the kind of consensus that would support the creation of a
new substantive due process right. At the same time, however, she
rejected the categorical approach that led Justice Scalia to the same
result. In particular, Justice O’Connor expressed concern about the
many legitimate issues relating to the termination of life-sustaining
171
medical treatment that were not then before the Court. Recognizing
that future cases may arise in different factual contexts, Justice
O’Connor insisted that the Court’s opinion did not foreclose “a future
determination that the Constitution requires the States to implement
the decisions of a patient’s duly appointed surrogate” or that states
may develop “other approaches for protecting an incompetent
172
individual’s liberty interest in refusing medical treatment.” For
Justice O’Connor, it was clear that these questions should not be
resolved by categorical judgments about whether a right existed at
some particular point in time or was compelled by some current wellaccepted doctrine. Each issue warranted its own balance of
considerations taking into account past practice, current
circumstances, and future issues yet to be fully defined. “As is evident
from the Court’s survey of state court decisions,” she wrote, “no

167. Id. at 280.
168. Id. at 281–82.
169. See, e.g., id. at 269–82 (tracing state and federal common-law roots in the individual’s
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment and the state’s interest in safeguarding that
decision).
170. See, e.g., id. at 286 (“Close family members may have a strong feeling—a feeling not at
all ignoble or unworthy, but not entirely disinterested, either—that they do not wish to witness
the continuation of the life of a loved one which they regard as hopeless, meaningless, and even
degrading. But there is no automatic assurance that the view of close family members will
necessarily be the same as the patient’s would have been had she been confronted with the
prospect of her situation while competent.”).
171. Id. at 289–92 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 292.
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national consensus has yet emerged on the best solution for this
difficult and sensitive problem,” making them, for the moment,
173
especially suited to be “entrusted to the ‘laboratory’ of the States.”
Cruzan was followed seven years later by Washington v.
174
Glucksberg, which tested the constitutionally of Washington’s ban
on assisted suicide. This time, opinions by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Stevens and Souter reflect in various ways the Burkean
methodology evident in Justice Stevens’s and Chief Justice
175
Rehnquist’s opinions in Cruzan. First, all of the various opinions
assumed that the kind of question raised by the case was not settled
through absolute principles derived from some fixed past or from
reasoned judgment in the present, but rather, in Justice Souter’s
words, through a weighing of “clashing principles” “within the history
176
of our values as a people.” Each opinion also acknowledged the
importance of the ongoing debate over end-of-life decisions and the
177
difficult legal issues that these decisions raise. None suggested that
the case be decided by a single, trumping principle.
This respect for the past that does not forever settle the
questions of what values are fundamental for the future is inherent in
the common-law method. As stated by Justice Souter,
173. Id. (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(same).
174. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
175. Justice Ginsburg wrote separately to state that she agreed “substantially” with Justice
O’Connor’s concurring opinion. See id. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgments).
176. See id. at 764 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); see also, e.g., id. at 727–28
(majority opinion) (“That many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause
sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all
important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected . . . .” (citation omitted)); id. at 745–
46 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments) (“The state interests supporting a general rule
banning the practice of physician-assisted suicide do not have the same force in all cases.”); cf.
id. at 736–38 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that although the majority looked to “our
Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices,” there is no generalized right to commit suicide
because of “[t]he difficulty in defining terminal illness and the risk that a dying patient’s request
for assistance in ending his or her life might not be truly voluntary”).
177. Id. at 720 (majority opinion) (“[W]e ‘ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the
concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this
unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Collins v.
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992))); id. at 738 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“As the Court
recognizes, States are presently undertaking extensive and serious evaluation of physicianassisted suicide and other related issues.”); id. at 752 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments)
(“There remains room for vigorous debate about the outcome of particular cases that are not
necessarily resolved by the opinions announced today.”); id. at 784 (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“[T]he knowing and responsible mind is harder to assess.”).
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[T]he value of common-law method . . . [is that it] is suspicious of
the all-or-nothing analysis that tends to produce legal petrification
instead of an evolving boundary between the domains of old
principles. Common-law method tends to pay respect instead to
detail, seeking to understand old principles afresh by new examples
178
and new counterexamples.

Second, the view of tradition reflected in these three opinions is
complex and interactive. Tradition is given meaning through present
choices that are, themselves, shaped by changing circumstances. Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion is the most explicit in this regard. It
canvassed a broad swath of relevant traditions from the thirteenth179
century common law to contemporary state laws, acknowledging
both that bans on assisted suicide are deeply rooted and that the
“bans have in recent years been reexamined” (“and, generally,
180
reaffirmed”). It also then described changing circumstances and
evolving practices that may be relevant to current norms, including
living wills, surrogate health care decisionmaking, and the withdrawal
181
or refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment. It acknowledged that
the liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment have
never been “fully clarified” and “perhaps [are] not capable of being
fully clarified,” but instead have needed to be “carefully refined by
182
concrete examples.” Accordingly, the Court did not “find” tradition
in some fixed past. Rather, it “inquire[d] whether th[e] asserted right
183
has any place in our Nation’s traditions.” This inquiry requires a
choice, not a simple excavation—a choice that requires consideration
of both past and present. As Justice Souter remarked in his
concurrence, “[t]he new decision must take its place in relation to
184
what went before and further [cut] a channel for what is to come.”
Finally, the opinions in Glucksberg affirm that although the
185
common-law method is gradual, movements in any particular

178. Id. at 770 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
179. Id. at 711–16 (majority opinion).
180. Id. at 716.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 722.
183. Id. at 723.
184. Id. at 770 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (alteration in original) (quoting Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
185. See, e.g., id. (“The [common law] ‘tradition is a living thing,’ albeit one that moves by
moderate steps carefully taken.” (citation omitted) (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
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direction are not inevitable. The possibility of a new constitutional
right does not mean that one should be granted. Indeed, none of the
concurring Justices urged the identification of a new fundamental
right. After sympathetic analyses of the individual’s interests in
186
making end-of-life decisions without interference from the state, the
opinions examined the need for caution and the reasons why, in the
187
case of this particular right, deference to state legislatures was best.
Small differences in context might warrant a different result. For
example, the opinions suggested that the case would be a closer one,
and may well have come out differently, if the state did not allow for
sufficient dosages of pain-killing medication for terminally ill
188
patients. In the next case or in a different context, the right in
question might be better viewed as a more general “right to die with
189
dignity,” rather than the more narrow formulation of the right to
190
physician-assisted suicide. In this manner, the Glucksberg opinions
191
explore issues without forcing a premature resolution of them,
explicitly continuing—rather than foreclosing—the ongoing debate
192
on the nature of life-and-death decision making.

186. See, e.g., id. at 777–79 (discussing respondents’ liberty interest in bodily integrity).
187. E.g., id. at 782–89; id. at 720 (majority opinion) (“[W]e have a tradition of carefully
formulating the interest at stake in substantive-due-process cases.”); id. at 737 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“[E]ven assuming that we would recognize such an interest, I agree that the State’s
interests . . . are sufficiently weighty to justify a prohibition against physician-assisted suicide.”).
188. See, e.g., id. at 736–38 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[I]n these States a patient who is
suffering from a terminal illness and who is experiencing great pain has no legal barriers to
obtaining medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even to the point of
causing unconsciousness and death . . . . [T]here is no need to address the question whether
suffering patients have a constitutionally cognizable interest in obtaining relief from the
suffering that they may experience in the last days of their lives.”); id. at 790–92 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgments) (stating that because statutes at issue permit drugs for pain, this
case makes it unnecessary to decide if there is a fundamental right to “die with dignity”).
189. Id. at 790 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgments).
190. See id. at 723 (majority opinion) (“[T]he question before us is whether the ‘liberty’
specifically protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself
includes a right to assistance in doing so.”).
191. See, e.g., id. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that there is no reason to reach
respondents’ narrower question in the context of the facial challenges at issue).
192. See, e.g., id. at 735 (“Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and
profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our
holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.”); id. at 738
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments) (“The Court ends its opinion with the important
observation that our holding today is fully consistent with a continuation of the vigorous debate
about the ‘morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide’ in a democratic
society. I write separately to make it clear that there is also room for further debate about the
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2. Private Sexual Conduct Between Individuals of the Same Sex.
While a number of the opinions in Bowers and Lawrence work from a
193
dichotomous view of past and present, other opinions in these cases
adopt a richer, more integrative view. Justice Stevens’s dissenting
opinion in Bowers is one such example. According to Justice Stevens,
past rules and attitudes are relevant to substantive due process
194
195
decisions, but so are current attitudes and norms. The point of
tradition is not to congeal past practices, but to provide the context
for choosing among multiple, evolving possibilities of who we are as a
society. As Justice Stevens pointed out in Bowers, the “tradition of
respect for the dignity of individual choice in matters of conscience”
196
is itself “[g]uided by history.” The focus of tradition is what is to be
carried forward from the past, rather than what the past, at some time
frozen in the past, forever compels.
For pragmatic as well as doctrinal reasons, this view of tradition
does not mean that courts are free to revise tradition continually to
suit their own ideological agendas. Tradition operates as a real
constraint. To repeat Justice Harlan’s words, “[a] decision of this
Court which radically departs from it could not long survive, while a
197
decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound.”
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence explicitly adopted
198
Justice Stevens’s approach to tradition, extending it with the help of
fuller briefing on the history of sodomy than the Court had in
199
Bowers. Justice Stevens had noted in Bowers that traditional
antisodomy regulations were directed against both homosexual and
200
201
Under Griswold v. Connecticut
and
heterosexual sodomy.

limits that the Constitution places on the power of the States to punish the practice.” (quoting
id. at 735 (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (citation omitted)).
193. See supra notes 24–36, 43, 47, 52–54, 79–81, 84–85 and accompanying text.
194. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 217 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Society has
every right to encourage its individual members to follow particular traditions [relating to]
expressing affection for one another and in gratifying their personal desires.”), overruled by
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
195. See id. at 219–20 (reasoning that because Georgia’s prohibition on private, consensual
sodomy had not been enforced for decades, the state’s interest could not be characterized as
important).
196. Id. at 217 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem’l Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719–20 (1975)).
197. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
198. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78.
199. See id. at 567–71 (citing the aid of scholarly amicus briefs).
200. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 215 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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202

Eisenstadt v. Baird, any application of the statute to heterosexual
203
couples would be unconstitutional. In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy
noted further that “[i]t was not until the 1970s that any State singled
out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution, and only nine States
204
have done so.” Moreover, the tradition of sodomy prohibitions
205
upon which Bowers was based had been eroded, both statutorily
and in terms of the more recent decisions of Planned Parenthood of
206
207
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and Romer v. Evans. With
208
these developments, the deficiencies of Bowers became clearer, and
the connections between Casey and Romer and antisodomy statutes
209
became more evident.
In the course of reversing Bowers, Justice Kennedy stated that
210
Bowers was wrongly decided. Such an admission of error might
have been necessary if substantive due process was a static doctrine,
tethered to a fixed, discretely bounded concept of tradition, as
211
Justices Scalia and Alito maintain. But, although an explanation of
the Court’s reversal of its seventeen-year-old decision in Bowers is
essential to explaining the decision, the confession that the Court
erred in Bowers is misplaced, and apology was unnecessary. If
tradition is a commitment the Court chooses, not discovers, its
choices need not—indeed, sometimes should not—remain stationary
over time. Because tradition is an evolving concept, what might at
one time have been insufficient as a tradition to support an important
liberty interest might later become sufficient, and vice versa. It is,
perhaps, unfortunate that although the majority opinion reflects an
interactive view of tradition, the Lawrence Court did not seem to fully
appreciate or own that view.
3. Grandparent Visitation. One of the more interesting examples
of an organic view of tradition is Troxel v. Granville. Troxel

202. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
203. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 215–19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570.
205. See id. 573 (pointing out that in 2003 only thirteen states prohibit sodomy, of which
only four enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct).
206. Id. at 573–74, 576 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
207. Id. at 574–76 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
208. Id. at 573.
209. Id. at 564–67.
210. Id. at 578 (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today.”).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 31–45, 50–57, 61–69.
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concerned the constitutionality of a Washington state statute broadly
authorizing courts to grant visitation to a child by “[a]ny person,”
even over the objection of the child’s parents, upon a determination
212
that visitation was in the child’s best interests. Unlike Justice
Scalia’s and Justice Thomas’s analyses of the case, mentioned in Part
213
I, the other opinions in the case reflect an interactive role of
tradition and change. Their method is deeply contextual, builds (at
most) incrementally on past decisions, and refrains from bold
holdings that decide more than is required (although there is
disagreement about which questions need to be decided). As in the
end-of-life decisions, the opinions differ on the way the case should
be decided, and yet all exemplify a brand of common-law
constitutionalism.
Writing for a plurality of the Court in Troxel, Justice O’Connor
surveyed the seventy-five-year evolution of Supreme Court cases
developing the liberty interest of parents, highlighting the links
between those prior decisions and the history and culture of Western
214
civilization of which they were a part. She also examined the
215
“changing realities of the American family” and the traditional
statutory means by which states generally protect parental decisions
216
on behalf of their children. She carefully dissected the lower court
opinions to reveal that the trial court had simply disagreed with the
mother, factually, about a matter that traditionally had been left to
217
parents—what is in a child’s best interests. Finally, her opinion
carefully limited its own reach to the particular statute at issue, as
interpreted by the state supreme court. That court had held that the
statute was unconstitutional because it did not require that harm or
potential harm to the child be established before visitation was

212. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000) (plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
213. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
214. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66 (plurality opinion).
215. Id. at 64.
216. See, e.g., id. at 70 (citing state statutes requiring consideration of whether visitation
rights would interfere with the parent-child relationship).
217. Id. at 72. Justice Souter in a concurring opinion extended the analysis of the lack of
deference that the trial judge gave to the parent’s choice in this case, in light of the traditionally
protected constitutional rights of parents. See id. at 79 (Souter, J., concurring) (“It would be
anomalous . . . to subject a parent to any individual judge’s choice of a child’s associates from
out of the general population merely because the judge might think himself more enlightened
than the child’s parent.”).
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218

Justice O’Connor
ordered over the objection of the parent.
concluded that the best-interests standard gave too little deference to
parents, but she reserved the question of what minimal additional
limitations on the court’s power to order visitation over parent
219
objection should be. At each step of the analysis, she clearly
exposed what was at stake in the case, recognized that specific facts
matter, and refused to recognize the past, or any other factor, as a
trump.
While Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy favored a different
220
result in Troxel than Justice O’Connor, they shared her holistic
approach to history, factual context, and reason. Justice O’Connor’s
analysis took into account the historical premise of parents’ liberty
interest in their children, which is that parents are presumed to act in
221
the interests of their children. Exploring some of the same
constitutional record, Justice Stevens underlined the potential for
divergent interests between parents and children and the need for
222
constitutional sensitivity to the children’s interests. Justice Kennedy
also looked at history, precedent, contemporary practice, and
criticisms of the best-interests test—finding the record
223
“inconclusive.” He raised some common fact patterns that challenge
the premise that parents will act in their children’s best interests, such
as when the parents are not the child’s primary caretaker, or when
those seeking visitation have no legitimate and established
relationship with the child. These nontraditional circumstances are
not to be judged as good or bad, Justice Kennedy explained, but as
224
facts that might make a difference in future cases.
218. Id. at 63 (plurality opinion).
219. See id. at 73 (holding that the statute’s unlimited rights for third-party visitation
petitions were unconstitutional, but not reaching the question of whether harm must be a basis
for third-party visitation statutes).
220. Justice Stevens would have overruled the lower court because he believed that the
statute might still be interpreted in a constitutional way. Id. at 85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennedy would have overruled the lower court because he read the Washington
Supreme Court opinion to say, wrongly, that the best-interests test is never appropriate in thirdparty visitation cases. Id. at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 65–73 (plurality opinion).
222. Id. at 87–88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 96–100 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
224. See id. at 98, 100–02 (“Cases are sure to arise . . . in which a third party, by acting in a
caregiving role over a significant period of time, has developed a relationship with a child which
is not necessarily subject to absolute parental veto.”). Justices O’Connor and Stevens also urged
caution. See id. at 73–74 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (“[T]he constitutional protections in
this area are best ‘elaborated with care.’” (quoting id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting))); id. at 90
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In sum, this set of opinions avoids absolute principles that deliver
knockout punches. The opinions directly engage the values
underlying the different sides of the case, showing how history,
precedent, and contemporary realities help shape those values. The
result is a transparent conversation that deepens rather than shuts
down deliberation about what this society deems fundamental to its
identity.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF AN INTEGRATIVE VIEW OF TRADITION
An integrative view of tradition recognizes that substantive due
process claims cannot be decided either by relying entirely on the
past, or by ignoring it. Tradition is not sufficient to establish or to
defeat a claim because it cannot be simply fast-forwarded to the
present. Traditions are either accepted or rejected, in part or in
whole, from among alternatives. Not to choose is not an available
option. If the past is to matter, the choice must be understood in
225
terms of the complexity of present circumstances and commitments.
If tradition does not define the content of substantive due
process in any unmediated way, neither can tradition be rejected
simply because it is tradition. Like tradition itself, an alternative to
tradition also emerges from past practices and norms; no right can be
deemed truly fundamental if it has not evolved from a past history
and stood some test of time. As Professor Martin Krygier writes, “any
particular ‘present’ is a slice through a continuously changing
diachronic quarry of deposits made by generations of people with
different, often inconsistent and competing values, beliefs, and views
226
of the world.” This quarry forms a “stock” representing the
“changing present of the tradition, to which each generation of
227
participants contributes in turn.” The tensions and inconsistencies
within this inventory called tradition make it necessary to choose, but
the stock is not unlimited.
There are a number of ways in which this view of tradition may
be viewed as dangerous, result-oriented, and lacking a limiting

(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the variety of family forms militates against a freestanding
constitutional rule).
225. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567–72 (2003) (reviewing the history of
sodomy regulations in light of the “emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex”).
226. Krygier, supra note 6, at 242.
227. Id.
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principle. In this Part, I identify and respond to some of these
potential criticisms. I then return to the point that primarily motivates
this Essay—that despite the potential problems inherent in this view
of tradition, the interactive model both reflects what tradition actually
is and how it is most relevant to substantive due process analysis.
Pretending tradition works, or should work, otherwise neither makes
it that way, nor improves the quality of decision making.
One potential criticism is that an integrative view of tradition
commits to political progressiveness, in that it will inevitably lead to a
one-way, legislature-disregarding expansion of individual rights. This
prediction comports with the hope and expectation of the liberal wing
228
of the Court, which subscribes to a linear view of history. Presentday politics as well as a host of Supreme Court decisions should
remind us, however, that traditions do not necessarily evolve in a
predictable fashion, or in a single “progressive” direction. I say this
both as a corrective to conservatives and a warning to liberals. At one
time substantive due process was seen to protect a contract freedom
229
from work-hour and minimum-wage restrictions; later, that right
230
was severely curtailed. Retrenchments in the areas of criminal

228. It is this view of history to which Justice Ginsburg subscribes when she asserts, citing
historian Richard Morris, that “[a] prime part of the history of our Constitution . . . is the story
of the extension of constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or excluded.”
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996) (citing RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE
FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789, at 193 (1987)). This perspective may be more compelling
with respect to equal protection rights than with substantive due process rights, see Tribe, supra
note 101, at 1897 (emphasizing the progressive purpose of equal protection doctrine, in contrast
to the inherent conservatism of substantive due process), although the expansion of equal
protection rights seems to have stopped, at least for the moment, see Yoshino, supra note 101, at
748 (noting the Court’s retrenchment against the trend of expanded equal protection).
Professors Kenji Yoshino and Laurence Tribe argue that the two doctrines are converging. See
Tribe, supra note 101, at 1898 (arguing that they are converging around the concept of selfgovernment); Yoshino, supra note 101, at 749 (arguing that they are converging around the
concept of dignity). Insofar as the difference between equal protection and substantive due
process has long been thought to be based on the distinction between protecting minorities from
traditional discrimination and protecting past traditions, see Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 101, at
1163, 1171 (observing that the Equal Protection Clause has been directed at historical
discrimination, whereas the Due Process Clause “limit[s] dramatic and insufficiently reasoned
change[] to protect tradition”), the convergence is consistent with a view of tradition that
evaluates past norms and practices in light of current commitments, including commitments to
equality, and evaluates present norms and practice in light of the traditions that give them shape
and meaning.
229. E.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 560–62 (1923) (striking down a
minimum-wage law), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking down a work-hour restriction).
230. E.g., West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 397.
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232

procedure and reproductive rights also demonstrate that rights
can shrink as well as expand. An interactive view of tradition means
233
that rights will evolve both “backward” and “forward,” with stare
decisis as a weight, but not an absolute brake in either direction.
Today, for example, as national consensus builds toward acceptance
of the liberty interests of gays and lesbians, it also builds toward
234
greater protection for the fetus, and in favor of gun rights.
Depending upon one’s politics, the direction an issue is moving may
be bad or good; either way, that direction helps determine who we are
as a society, a determination which is the fundamental inquiry of
substantive due process.
Another potential criticism is that the integrative view of
tradition introduces excessive indeterminacy in substantive due
process cases. There is no denying that the doctrine offers more room
235
to maneuver than most other provisions of the Constitution. But

231. See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2267, 2269, 2275, 2278 (2010)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision turns Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),]
upside down.”); Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 16–25 (2010) (reviewing Supreme Court precedents
“gradually overruling” Miranda).
232. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132–33, 168 (2007) (cutting back on the
abortion right in response to a facial challenge to a federal ban on partial-birth abortions).
233. It is not always clear, of course, which is which. Professors Reva Siegel and Jack Balkin
have demonstrated how progressive law reform sometimes simply provides new frameworks
within which old inequalities and injustices are maintained. For Professor Siegel’s theory of
“preservation through transformation,” see Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the
Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 77, 83 (2000); Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife-Beating as Prerogative
and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2175–88 (1996); and Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111,
1113 (1997). Similarly, Professor Balkin notes that “in each era people will try to use the logics,
rhetorics, and doctrines of equality to preserve power, conserve privilege, and establish greater
inequality.” JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN
UNJUST WORLD 143 (2011).
234. Specifically on the argument why progressives who believe in a fundamental right to
contraceptives and abortion should accept gun ownership as a fundamental right, Professor
Akhil Amar writes that both are “simply facts of life, the residue of a virtually unchallenged
pattern and practice on the ground in domains where citizens act freely and governments lie
low.” Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV. 145,
185 (2008); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122
HARV. L. REV. 246, 271 (2008) (“In many ways, Heller may be no less defensible than
Griswold . . . .”).
235. Substantive due process is not unique, of course, in its indeterminacy. The Eighth
Amendment prohibition of cruel or unusual punishment, for example, is keyed to “evolving
standards of decency.” See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–61 (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)(plurality opinion) (2005); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
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this should not be surprising, insofar as the doctrine is designed to
protect something inherently indeterminate—namely, values. A
holistic, integrative view of tradition confronts and embraces the
values aspect of substantive due process, not because indeterminacy is
preferred to determinacy—it is not—but because the protection of
our fundamental values is an essential feature of our constitutional
scheme, as even Justice Scalia concedes, at least when he is prepared
236
the recognize a particular claim. If we are to respect that feature, we
need to tolerate some looseness in the joints. Shining a light on the
nature of tradition to show that past and present both are relevant to
determining those values improves substantive due process by making
237
it more transparent. Values are not avoided by relying solely on a
fixed view of tradition; they are simply masked. Nor are they avoided
by rejecting tradition altogether in favor of general principles of
liberty and freedom; some limiting principle is necessary to ensure
that constitutional protection is extended to only the most
fundamental and basic components of our liberty.
Additionally, it is important to note that an interactive view of
tradition is not more indeterminate than the alternatives—except
insofar as one might define tradition to predictably rule out, or accede
to, most claims. Under an either/or view of tradition, Justices can
easily defeat a claim by confining substantive due process analysis to
the narrowest possible tradition and precedent, or by defining
traditions and precedents broadly enough to support the
identification of new rights. Both approaches are fully predictable
from the method applied—but they are hardly free of judicial
preferences. The plain truth of the matter is that defining values that

15, 30–32 (1973) (announcing the “contemporary community standards” test for evaluating
obscene material under the First Amendment).
236. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(agreeing with the majority opinion that the right to bear arms is a fundamental right). What
Justice Scalia does not concede is that courts should have anything to do with determining those
values. Id. at 3058. For a sampling of the voluminous scholarship demonstrating the complex
interaction between legislation, public advocacy, and constitutional decisionmaking in setting
constitutional values, see generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW
PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (2009); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism,
Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027 (2004); and Reva Siegel,
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De
Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
237. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3119 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (urging transparency in
substantive due process cases).
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are so important that they warrant a high level of constitutional
protection is necessarily a difficult, value-laden enterprise.
A related critique is that an approach not anchored in a fixed,
ascertainable past is too subjective. The question is, again—subjective
as compared to what? The debates over history in the opinions in
McDonald and Lawrence make clear that neither past values nor
present-day ones are self-evident. Ironically, taking account of both
past and present together may provide greater determinacy and
objectivity than taking account of either alone. Each can help act as a
potential limit on the other. The past puts limits on what present
norms warrant constitutional protection and the present constrains
what past values are carried forward. Traditions that matter are those
both grounded in the past and owned in the present.
This more connected view of tradition will not necessarily result
in fewer 5–4 votes. Besides the Justices’ opposing views on tradition,
238
there are philosophical differences or “constitutional visions” that
affect how Justices decide cases. Articulating those values in terms of
the connection between past and present also will not reduce the
vehemence with which these values are held. To the extent that
values are deeply important, views toward them also will be deeply
held. A fuller, engaged view of tradition will make clearer, however,
that questions about fundamental liberties are not about accepting or
rejecting tradition, but about ascertaining from our past and present
who we are as a society. Being open about the value assumptions in
such an analysis is a key ingredient of principled adjudication, and
contributes to the transparency that is itself important to a
constitutive societal dialogue about the meaning of liberty and
freedom.
CONCLUSION
When judges are explicit and honest that questions of value
cannot be decided on the basis of a single objective principle, they
skip the charade that either tradition is a fixed measure of that
principle, or that it is a useless anachronism to be rejected in
substantive due process cases. The abortion debate is not about
whether or not traditional “family values” should be preserved or
rejected, nor can it be resolved either through the authority of a

238. See Neil S. Siegel, “Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’s Constitutional Values,
43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 799, 803–04 (2009).
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single, fixed “tradition” unmediated by present norms or through
reason alone. It is about what role for the state best expresses our
collective fundamental values about life, personal autonomy, and
women’s place in society, as they have been passed forward from the
past and accepted and revised in the present. A similar point can be
made about such issues as gay rights, health care, immigration, and
capitalism. This Essay’s approach demands of conservatives greater
attention to current realities, the abandonment of “objective
traditions to which no one attends,” and “subjective attachment to
239
Of liberals, it asks for more serious
nonexistent pasts.”
240
investigations of the past that should be rejected, and for respect for
241
the parts of our past to which society remains attached. The need to
connect new claims to the familiar will make some claims more
unlikely and others, perhaps, more appealing. In either case, it may
make liberal advocates more pragmatic about the compromises that
242
might be required for effective forward movement.

239. The phrases are Professor Krygier’s. Krygier, supra note 6, at 256.
240. See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text. Professor Reva Siegel has done
critically important work along these lines. See generally Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body:
A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 261 (1992) (arguing that because abortion regulations were motivated by gender
stereotypes, equal protection is the appropriate constitutional framework for examining
abortion laws); see also Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims
Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994) (arguing that
women’s claims for a joint property regime are not new claims, but rather were first made in the
nineteenth century, as part of protests about the undervaluation of household labor).
241. Professor Cary Franklin’s effort to rediscover the roots of a non-formalist definition of
sex discrimination in the legislative history of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006 &
Supp. IV 2011)), is an example of how the affirmative excavation of history and tradition can
have more potential pay-off than rejecting the relevance of the past. See Cary Franklin,
Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307 (2012).
242. Consideration of the residual values from the past may make us more pragmatic about
other legal doctrines, including equal protection. For example, Professor Reva Siegel refutes the
binary division of Justices between those who favor racial equality and those who do not, by
explaining how “race moderates” sometimes allow civil rights initiatives and sometimes restrict
them, depending upon the impact of those initiatives on social cohesion. Race moderates reject
civil rights initiatives that offend whites and thereby set them against the rights of blacks, in part
to avoid setting whites against blacks, or “balkanization.” Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness
to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J.
1278, 1297, 1300 (2011). The Court’s highly controversial opinion in Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.
Ct. 2658 (2009), is one example of the antibalkanization principle, insofar as it represents the
rejection of a city’s polarizing efforts to protect the rights of minority firefighters who had not
done well on the city’s written promotion exams. Balkanization can be viewed as a consequence
of a residual legacy of race discrimination to which race reformers should be sensitive—not just
as a past to be defeated, but as the present synthesis of past and present that must be
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Tradition deserves neither “undiscriminating praise [n]or
243
blame.” It is a challenging concept that requires courts to wrestle
with identifying the strongest and most valuable commitments of our
past and present collective selves. That this is a contested undertaking
fraught with value clashes does not mean that we should oversimplify
tradition to avoid being overrun with substantive due process
challenges, or that we should jettison the concept of tradition
altogether. Tradition, properly understood, focuses us on the right
question for substantive due process analysis; if we cannot always
agree on where this leads us, we can at least be engaged in the same
debate.

pragmatically taken into account. Along these lines, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on
Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace
Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893 (2010). The sensitivity of “race moderates” to the impact of
Court decisions on values that are carryovers from the past demonstrates the same kind of need
for mediation of past and present as is present in the context of many substantive due process
cases.
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